UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-7-2014

State v. Freitas Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41378

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Freitas Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41378" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4771.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4771

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/
Respondent,

v.
MICHAEL 1. FREITAS,

Defendant/
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 14378
CR-12-0018513

FIt

. COpy

MAR - 7 20'4

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE LANSING HAYNES
District Judge

JOHN M. ADAMS
Kootenai County Public Defender

LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

JAY LOGSDON
Deputy Public Defender
400 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases and Authorities ....................................................................................................... ii
Argument
I.

The state misrepresents the standard of review for void for vagueness challenges
to criminal statutes and argues that the ordinance at issue should be read to mean
everything anyone could ever possibly read into it .................................................. 1

II.

The state argues that the ordinance at issue in this case legitimately created a
monopoly on water delivery within the City of Spirit Lake in spite of the lack of
state level authority to create one ........................................................... 3

III.

The state ignores the traditions and values of the people at its peril. ...................... .4

IV.

The state forgets that the elements instruction was based on an interpretation of the
law previously made by the Magistrate on the basis of the defendant's objection,
and fails to even argue that the defendant's interpretation of the statute is
incorrect. ........................................................................................ 6

V.

The state misrepresents the standard of review for insufficient evidence
claims ............................................................................................ 7

Certificate of Delivery ..................................................................................................................... 8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System. Inc., No. 11-1160. --- S.Ct. ----, 2013 WL 598434 (U.S.20 I3)---------------3
Marbury v. Mad iso n, 5 U. S. 137 (1803) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352 (1996) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
State v. Alley, --- P .3d ----, 2014 WL 521457 (Ct.App.20 14) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4
Yin-Shing Woo v. U.S., 288 F.2d 434 ( 1961 ) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I
STATUTES AND RULES

I. C.R. 4 8----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Spirit Lake Ord inance 7-4-1 0---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Idaho Constitution, Article I § 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Tertu II ian, Apo loget icus, L ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William Stephens Smith (13 November 1787) -------------------------------------------------- 5

11

ARGUMENT

I.
The state responds to the defendant's argument that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void
for vagueness on its face by claiming that as long as some grammatically sound formulation can
be extrapolated from the garbled language of the law at hand, the Constitution is satisfied. The
state points to the various "reasonable" interpretations created by the District Court, and even
finds acceptable the examples posited by the defendant. The Constitution, declares the state,
requires that the people be given adequate notice, and breaking down clumps of nonsense words
into understandable prohibitions is enough.
The state's argument is attractive in that it provides the utmost protection to the law "'as
is," and thus seems to protect the decisions of the legislative body and thereby the people that
enacted it. However, the state's desired jurisprudence essentially died when the concept of the
void for vagueness challenge was born. The void for vagueness challenge is about more than
simply ensuring that the people and law enforcement know what the legislature intends. In the
words of Chief Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit:
We should of course yield to the text, when the text is plain, but 'good order' is a
word of vague content; particularly when used as an alternate to 'good moral
character.' If it be answered that this bases our construction on our personal
judgment of the public importance of the conduct involved, we agree. Not
infrequently a legislature means to leave to the judges the appraisal of some of the
values at stake. For example, those rights, criminal and civil, that are measured by
what is 'reasonable,' really grant to courts such a 'legislative' power, although we
call the issues questions of fact. They require of the judges the compromise that
they think in accord with the general purposes of the measure as the community
would understand it. We are of course aware of the resulting uncertainties

involved in such an interpretation; but the alternative would be specifically to
provide for each situation that can arise, a substitute utterly impractical in
operation. We can say no more than that we think it plain that this statute did not
mean to make naturalization depend upon obedience to such a regulation as that
before us. We call this function 'interpretation,' so long as the scope of the
appraisal and choice is not too wide; although when it is too wide, we call the
statute invalid, as a 'delegation' oflegislative power. In the case at bar we hold
that disobedience to the parking regulations of a great city, even though repeated
and deliberate, does not show a disposition contrary to the 'good order' of the
United States; and was a permissible delegation of power.

Yin-Shing Woo v, US., 288 F,2d 434 (1961). When ajudge finds herself breaking down a
criminal statute into understandable segments that do not even contain the language originally
found in the law, as the District Judge had to do in this case, it is tantamount to admitting that the
law as written was not understandable, and further, that the judge is making law.
Particularly where, as here, the state finds itself arguing for contradictory interpretations
of the same law, that law must be found void. (See Brief of Respondent at 6 adopting the District
Court's interpretations and compare with p. 7 arguing that defendant's interpretations are
reasonable as well.) The standard of clarity for a criminal law, above all, needs be higher than
reasonable break downs of syntactically confusing run-on sentences,
Lastly, the state's argument that the defendant had notice of what the law meant because
a police officer told him of her interpretation of the ordinance is a rather odd argument that
forgets that in our system of separated powers it is the judiciary and not the executive that
decides what the law is. See Marbury v, Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), The officer's explanation
is the reddest of herrings, and counsel for the defense is deeply troubled by the fact that the state
keeps referring to it as if it had some talismanic power.

2

II.
The state claims in response to the defendant's argument that the City of Spirit Lake went
beyond the authority it had been granted in creating a monopoly of the delivery of city water that
not only has the City created said monopoly but in fact the City has created a monopoly on the
delivery of water. period. Brief of Respondent at 9. The state points to no authority that allows a
municipality to pass such a law. The District Court never directly responded to the issue in its
opinion. The District Court did find that criminal penalties could be used to benefit the
corporation and its trade, commerce, and industry. Intermediate Appellate Opinion at II.
The problem with the Court's formulation is that, while certainly the creation of a
monopoly benefits whoever controls it, and the people of a particular town may decide that no
one may be allowed water unless they pay for city water first, the choice to create that monopoly
requires more direction from the state legislature than the statutes and constitutional sections the
District Court relied on. See generally F. T C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System. Inc., No. 11
1160. --- S.Ct. ----, 2013 WL 598434 at *6 (U.S.2013). The choice to essentially socialize water
delivery and bring the might of the state to bear as has been done in Spirit Lake is one that per
the precedents of the United States Supreme Court, need be made by a higher authority. It
cannot be enough to say that the monopoly is good for the people. The free market, while not
constitutionally guaranteed, cannot be so easily dismissed. Interstate businesses' interests will be
affected by laws that essentially bar them from providing water to the residents of Spirit Lake.
Decisions of this magnitude cannot be made at the local level alone.

3

III.
The state argues in its response that the Constitutions of neither the country nor this state
provide any protection for acts of charity. Aesop wrote that a tyrant will always find a
justification for his tyranny. In this instance, the state simply relies on the fact that rules are
rules. Indeed, that has been the theme of the rejections of the defendant's arguments and conduct
since the case began. See Tr. Vol. I, p. 7, L. 9-16, Vol. II, p. 29, L. 6-12, p. 31, L. 1-4, p. 31, L.
18-25, p. 32, L. 1-21, p. 159, L. 14-17; Intermediate Appellate Opinion at 12.
The state dismisses the defendant's references to charity's place in the traditions of the
American people as being unrelated to the Constitution. However, the Constitution does protect
conduct "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." See Washington v. Giucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997). For complex reasons, rights once thought to be protected by the
Ninth Amendment have been generally found to exist within the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Defense counsel admits that it can be difficult to say where in the
Constitution rights are protected in view of modern jurisprudence, and thus he takes the safest
route of relying on all of the relevant passages of the Constitution thought to protect the ordered
liberties of our people.
The District Court recognized that defense counsel is right. Intermediate Appellate
Opinion at 12. The problem, from the perspective of this Court and the law, is how to define a
right to provide charity such that it is a "'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest." Id The defendant has no need of a broad right in this case. A narrow finding that no
government in the United States may criminalize the free distribution of water would suffice.
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The government and Court's concern for the safety of the people is presumably answered
through regulation, much like the regulation of speech and firearms. But to Iiterally ban, punish,
and label criminal the giving of water to a child who is without is monstrous.
Counsel for the defendant will not irk the state by quoting from the Bible a second time.
He will, however, point this Court to a relevant passage from Tertullian's Apologeticus, L.:

Plures efJicimur quotiens melimur a vobis: semen est sanguis Christianorum. I
2

Thomas Jefferson made similar warning. See Letter to William Stephens Smith (13 November
1787). The kernel of truth in these declarations is that when one oppresses the deeply held
values and beliefs of a people not only does that oppression accomplish nothing, it backfires.
The Constitution is a contract between the people of the United States and their government. It
is unreasonable to believe that they allowed the government the power to oppress their deeply
held values and traditions when they ratified that document.
The defendant also points again to the Idaho Constitution. Recent developments at the
national level leave some with the suspicion that the federal Constitution has been decoupled
from morality. The Idaho Supreme Court has never given up the responsibility placed upon our
state's government under Article I § I of the Idaho Constitution to heed the ethics and morality
of its people. This Court should rely on it to find that the ordinance as applied in this matter was
in violation of the traditions and values of the people ofIdaho and the conviction cannot stand.

We multiply whenever we are mown down by you: the blood of Christians is the seed.
And what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people
preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and pacify
them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with
the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.
I

2
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IV.
The state argues that the defendant cannot complain of the instruction for the elements of
the ordinance at issue because he consented to them. However, the state must remember that the
defendant had attacked the statute and made the argument as to what he believed the ordinance
should be read to mean at the motions hearing held on January 3.2013. Also. at that hearing. the
Magistrate issued a ruling as to what the ordinance meant. Tr Vol. I, p. 26. L. 22-25. p. 27, L. J17. The defendant, relying on the law of the case, had no objection to the use of the Magistrate
Court's formulation of the ordinance, inasmuch as the existence of that formulation was but-for
the defendant's argument that the ordinance did not apply to him. The defendant did not waive
that earlier objection; he was simply recognizing that the issue had already been ruled upon.
The state then argues that the defendant's interpretation of the statute, even if correct,
does not mean that the instruction was incorrect. Since a quick comparison of the elements
instruction given and the defendant's interpretation of the statute would reveal the rather
important lack of instructing the jury that the defendant could only be guilty had he permitted
connection or delivery of city water from the city's water distribution system, counsel for the
defendant does not follow the state's reasoning. The elements instruction is for an entirely
different crime. And regardless of the state's protest to the contrary, the issue as to what the
proper elements of a criminal law are is not a question of whether to dismiss a case outright per
I.C.R. 48, but a question of how to properly instruct ajury. See generally Slale v. Alley, --- P.3d
----, 2014 WL 521457 at *8-*9 (Ct.App.2014).
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The state responds along the same lines to the defendant's appeal of the denial of his
proffered instruction as to what is city property. The defendant recognizes that these two issues
are linked, but reiterates that the jury would have been better served by being allowed to see all
that the law stated. As to the accusations the state makes that the defendant somehow changed
the law for his instruction, the defendant simply asks the court to look at his requested
Instruction Six. It is exactly what the state argues that the law is.

v.
The state finally argues that the defendant failed to establish that he did not get his water
from someone besides Spirit Lake. Fortunately for the defendant, that was not his burden.
Rather, the question is simply whether a reasonable trier of fact would convict on the facts in
evidence. State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 355 (1996). There was no evidence that the
defendant received water from the City of Spirit Lake. Try as it might, the state cannot
overcome the reasonable possibility left open by the state's case that the water did not come from
the City of Spirit Lake. Thus, the conviction must be overturned.

2__C__ day of February, 2014.

DATED this _ _
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